Keywords: mimesis, violence, human sacrifice, scapegoat, anthropology, atonement, Christianity, paganism.
René Girard’s (1923 – 2015) mimetic theory, while offering valuable insights into human
behaviour and cultural formation, lacks sufficient empirical evidence and overextends its explanatory reach. His
theory begins with a compelling premise about the fundamental role of mimetic desire in human behaviour, but
extends this concept beyond reasonable bounds. As Girard asserts: “The unanimous mimeticism of the scapegoat
is the true ruler of human society” (Girard, 1986, p. 145). Since social life originates from
humanity’s mimetic nature, all communities inevitably face a “sacrificial
crisis” — a state of chaos resulting from the dissolution of social distinctions. Before
Christianity’s emergence, this mechanism served as a necessary evil:
Because humans imitate one another, they have had to find a means of dealing with contagious similarity, which could lead to the pure and simple disappearance of their society. The mechanism by which they have done that is sacrifice, which reintroduces difference into a situation in which everyone has come to resemble everyone else. (Girard, 2009)
According to this theory, societies had to persecute certain members to maintain their structure; without this mechanism, humanity would collapse into an undifferentiated mass, lacking the distinctions necessary for social organization. (This perspective implies that biological differences alone are insufficient to maintain social differentiation.) Girard centers his account of human origins on what he terms the “founding murder” — a collective killing of a single victim. This concept parallels Sigmund Freud’s notion of the “primordial murder.” Such collective violence temporarily rescues the community from descending into chaos and indiscriminate aggression. As Girard explains:
People become so burdened with scandals that they desperately, if unconsciously, seek public substitutes, collective targets upon whom to unburden themselves. All those who join a belligerent crowd transfer their private scandals to some public target. As more and more people join in, the common victim’s attractiveness as a victim increases, and the process becomes irresistible. This explains why Jesus uses the word scandal in connection with his Passion. When he warns his disciples that he is about to become a scandal to them, it really means that they will be affected by the mimetic tidal wave. (Girard, 1993)
Sacrificial rituals, therefore, represent a ritualized reenactment of this founding murder. Both pagan societies
and early biblical culture operated on a conception of the sacred that centered on the collective persecution of
wrongly accused scapegoats (“emissary victims”). This mechanism exploits humanity’s tendency to
project guilt and internal conflicts onto arbitrary targets. (Here, ‘scapegoat’ carries its modern
connotation of “fall guy.”) Girard contends that paganism operated through a sacrificial economy that
reproduced the cathartic effect of the founding murder, thereby amplifying the generative force of malevolence and
cruelty. Violence thus becomes the primary driver of society, with sacred violence serving as the wellspring of
culture.
In this framework, the sociological function of scapegoat sacrifice is “to limit violence as much as possible
but to turn to it, if necessary, as a last resort to avoid an even greater violence” (Girard, 1986,
p. 113). Christianity represents a fundamental reversal of this pattern, shifting from the economy of
sacrifice toward the generative power of justice, mercy, and forgiveness. The Christian “true myth”
uniquely addresses this core aspect of human nature and society by adopting the perspective of the
scapegoat — “the sacred type of representation of persecution.” The revelation
“assures the reformation of the authorities through the mediation of the scapegoat, or in other words the
sacred” (ibid. pp. 113-15). The Passion narrative uniquely reveals the scapegoat’s innocence,
exposing the baseless nature of persecution and effectively reversing the founding murder. By exposing this sacred
persecutorial mechanism, the Passion narrative fundamentally disarms it.
Human cultures have managed violence through the sacrificial economy, maintaining it at sustainable levels while
perpetuating its mythology. However, this mechanism inevitably fails, leading to apocalyptic violence. The
gospels’ apocalyptic predictions refer to earthly violence initiated by humans, not divine intervention (cf.
Girard, 2003, p. 260). Similarly, the Book of Job reveals that Job’s suffering stems from his
community, not God (despite Job’s contrary belief). While God still carries traces of the persecutory deity
in Job, violence no longer defines the divine nature. Christianity ultimately strips divinity of humanity’s
violent sacred projections (vid. Girard, 1987).
Unlike theological approaches, Girard’s analysis doesn’t proceed from metaphysical assumptions about
divinity. (Theology, by contrast, engages with authentic divine power.) For Girard, God represents an abstraction
of human projections. He advocates a “realistic” exegesis to deconstruct religion’s psychological
hold. His aim is to demystify traditional religion, arguing that its mythic content merely justifies arbitrary
violence against scapegoats (cf. Girard, 1979, p. 476). His psychosocial perspective stands distinct from
theology. As a philosophical anthropologist, he views secularization as Christianity’s natural modern
development rather than its antagonist. Girard states:
The same scapegoating that myth misunderstands and therefore reveres as sacred truth, the Gospels understand and denounce as the lie that it really is. This denunciation is the alpha and omega of all genuine deconstruction and demythification […] Far from being the scapegoat religion par excellence, Christianity is the only religion that explicitly rejects scapegoating as a basis for a religious epiphany. (Girard, 1993)
This represents an agnostic theory of atonement, where Christ’s death serves merely to pacify human
violence. It falls short of a genuine Christian atonement theory, which holds that Christ’s sacrifice is
universal, redeeming the entire cosmos from sin’s corrupting influence. Yet it is Girard, not theologians,
who displays bias in matters of atonement by claiming that all previous exegetes misinterpreted biblical evidence.
Consider the Old Testament sacrifice in Genesis 22: Did Abraham truly intend to sacrifice Isaac because he viewed
him as guilty? Did he redirect onto Isaac an anger properly meant for enemy tribes? Such interpretations contradict
the biblical narrative. Rather, Abraham’s sacrifice appears to represent an internal
transformation — the sacrifice was spiritually completed when he raised the knife. This
interpretation of sacrifice as internal devotion aligns with the prophets’ occasional rejection of
sacrificial cult. Scholars suggest that Amos, Hosea, and others opposed ritualistic formality divorced from genuine
inner devotion, condemning sacrificial practices that had devolved into idolatry.
Historically, sacrifices have functioned to restore the relationship between humanity and the divine. As theologian
John S. Mbiti explains, in African sacrificial traditions, bloodshed represents the return of human or
animal life-spirit to God (or demanding spirits), empowering the divine to restore earthly order (Mbiti, 1975,
pp. 57-59). This pagan theological understanding contradicts Girard’s assertion that sacrifice
primarily appeases human wrath. Central to Girard’s theory is ‘misrecognition’
(méconnaissance) — a “unanimous misunderstanding” essential to the scapegoat
mechanism’s operation. The community must believe the victim bears ultimate responsibility for social unrest
or violations of divine order. The peace following the victim’s death reinforces this belief. This concept of
misrecognition may be Girard’s most valuable contribution, suggesting that projections of malevolence serve a
psychological function beyond mere errors in judgment. As Girard states:
As we have seen, the sacrificial process requires a certain degree of misunderstanding. The celebrants do not and must not comprehend the true role of the sacrificial act. The theological basis of the sacrifice has a crucial role in fostering this misunderstanding. It is the god who supposedly demands the victims; he alone, in principle, who savors the smoke from the altars and requisitions the slaughtered flesh. (Girard, 1979, p. 7)
Girard’s application of misrecognition to divine service appears implausible. Could the Leviticus
scapegoat truly alleviate social unrest merely because people believed it responsible for their transgressions?
This view suggests that the sacrifice’s healing power depended on perceiving the goat as
evil — an unrealistic assumption. Historical evidence of child and virgin sacrifices
demonstrates that victims could bear sin precisely because of their purity and innocence. The sacrificial lamb
exemplifies this principle — its very sinlessness makes it an ideal sacrifice. Just as a clean
towel better serves to clean dirty hands than a soiled one.
Misrecognition forms the cornerstone of Girard’s theory. He rejects the traditional understanding that
sacrifice atones for sins against God, viewing such interpretation as regression to “old religion” and
archaic sacrificial patterns: “The sacrificial reading is basically a form of
regression — slight but consequential — to the notions of the Old
Testament” (Girard, 2003, p. 226). Contradicting classical interpretation, he equates sacrifice with
mere violence: “[T]he sacrificial act assumes two opposing aspects, appearing at times as a sacred obligation
to be neglected at grave peril, at other times as a sort of criminal activity entailing perils of equal
gravity” (Girard, 1979, p. 1). This conflation of murder and sacrifice overlooks their fundamental
differences. While misrecognition aptly describes witch hunts and mob violence, divine service involves spiritual
discernment — people recognize the innocent sacrificial lamb bearing their sin and restoring
divine harmony. Humans are capable of both perspectives.
Girard must unite these distinct forms because he views the theological understanding of sacrifice as a
misconception that perpetuates violence through mythological thinking. He insists on a purely profane
interpretation of violence:
Joseph de Maistre takes the view that the ritual victim is an “innocent” creature who pays a debt for the “guilty” party. I propose an hypothesis that does away with this moral distinction. As I see it, the relationship between the potential victim and the actual victim cannot be defined in terms of innocence or guilt. There is no question of “expiation.” Rather, society is seeking to deflect upon a relatively indifferent victim, a “sacrificeable” victim, the violence that would otherwise be vented on its own members, the people it most desires to protect. (ibid. p. 4)
Girard’s theory requires that people misrecognize the victim as the source of evil, but historical evidence contradicts this premise. As Davíd Carrasco explains:
The Aztec record does not show an evolution away from the sacrifice of the firstborn in a human family to a replacement animal. It does not record the “satanization” of the humans to be sacrificed (Juergensmeyer, “Performance Violence,” chapter 17). The people sacrificed in Tenochtitlan were always turned into living gods, the most valued or feared gods, and then led along by male and female ritual specialists on the pathway to the sacrificial altar. The surviving record does not theologize these killings as gift exchanges. The Aztec name for sacrifice was nextlaoalli (“the paying of the debt”) and the victims were called netlahualtin (“restitutions”) showing that the sacrifices did not emphasize gifts but rather debts (Sahagún 2002: vol. 2). Human children were sacrificed in the first month of every ritual year. Women were sacrificed in a third of the yearly sacrificial ceremonies. The term repeated again and again in the most reliable accounts provided by elders who participated in and witnessed the spectacular ceremonies is debt payment. (Juergensmeyer, 2015, p. 217)
The children were sacrificed not to satisfy collective murderous impulses but as payment to the gods. While Girard might argue that Aztec theology merely obscured the underlying truth, this was nonetheless their genuine belief. They did not view their firstborn children as sources of supernatural evil harming society. The practice parallels chess strategy, where players sacrifice pieces for immaterial advantages like tactical initiative or positional superiority. Religious sacrifice similarly exchanges material value for spiritual benefit. Hermann Oldenberg describes animal sacrifice in Vedic religion:
The sacrificial animal was killed with the expressions, common also to other people, of efforts to free oneself from the sin of a bloody deed and from impending revenge. It was told ‘You are not dying, you are not harmed, you are going to the gods along beautiful paths’ […] the killing was called euphemistically ‘to get the consent of the animal.’ (Oldenberg, 1988, p. 292)
Throughout history, all cultures have understood reality through material and spiritual categories. Transcending temporality means ascending or descending to the immaterial realm. The Letter to the Hebrews describes Christ’s sacrifice enabling his ascension to heaven, where he serves as High Priest mediating between God and humanity. Pagan theology follows similar principles. As Carrasco notes:
According to scholars such as Henninger, a wide range of objects including animals, plants, stones, and human-made items are used in sacrifices in various traditions. Of special importance is that the performance of sacrifices, of whatever material, establishes or rejuvenates intimate relationships with supernatural beings considered crucial to a community’s well-being. (Juergensmeyer, 2015, p. 211)
Girard rejects supernatural explanations, insisting that all sacrificial offerings stem from a murderous sociological mechanism:
As we have already seen, the notion that sacrifice serves primarily to bring us into contact with the “gods” makes little sense. For even if the gods are imaged forth at the conclusion of a long series of sacrifices, what are we to make of the preliminary rounds? What were the sacrificers thinking about at a time when they did not yet possess gods with whom to “communicate”? Why — for whom — were those rites performed under the vast celestial void? The passion that prompts modern antitheists to shift all blame onto the “gods” must not lead us astray. Sacrifice deals with humankind, and it is in human terms that we must attempt to comprehend it. (Girard, 1979, pp. 89-90)
Anthropologists and religious historians have rejected the notion that early humans lacked concepts of gods and spirits. Spiritual thinking emerged with consciousness itself. Humans naturally perceive intentionality in nature, reflecting our own cognitive patterns. Lightning might be experienced as the deliberate act of an invisible being — reasoning still common among children (vid. Piaget, 1975). In arid regions, people might seek to please the cloud spirit through valuable offerings like calves, believing the sacrificed spirit would enter the spiritual realm and please the cloud spirit. While some have dismissed aboriginal thinking as irrational, they actually employ logical reasoning within an animated worldview. As Mbiti observes regarding traditional African religion:
Many societies make sacrifices, offerings and prayers to God in connection with rain, especially during periods of drought. Rainmakers are reported in all parts of the continent, their duties being to solicit God’s help in providing rain, or in halting it if too much falls. Thunder is taken by many, such as the Bambuti, Bavenda, Ewe and Ha, to be God’s voice. Others like the Gikuyu and Zulu interpret it to be the movement of God; and some, like the Yoruba and Tiv, regard thunder as an indication of God’s anger. (Mbiti, 1970, p. 69)
Girard suggests that sacrifices preceded concepts of gods, arguing that the founding murder came first, with religion emerging as a rationalization for continued human sacrifice. However, historical evidence shows no period without belief in spirits and gods. Rather, sacrifice naturally evolved from spiritual thinking. Girard rejects both Christian and pagan atonement theories’ legal frameworks, arguing against the existence of a deity requiring penance:
Sacrifice has often been described as an act of mediation between a sacrificer and a “deity.” Because the very concept of a deity, much less a deity who receives blood sacrifices, has little reality in this day and age, the entire institution of sacrifice is relegated by most modern theorists to the realm of the imagination. (Girard, 1979, p. 6)
While Girard views sacrifice as violence prevention, evidence suggests primitive humans possessed moral and
juridical awareness. Even animals demonstrate concepts of fairness (cf. De Waal, 2016). When one tribe wronged
another through actions like cattle theft, retribution served to restore balance and moral order rather than
express vindictiveness. Such measures maintained divine order and prevented tribal warfare.
Similarly, when humans violated divine order, gods demanded retribution, with sacrifice serving to appease divine
anger. Violations against gods often paralleled human transgressions. From this perspective, mob violence
fundamentally differs from religious sacrifice. The former represents unchecked murderous impulses and destructive
projections — violations of divine law. The latter represents priestly efforts to rectify divine
infractions. Rather than controlled savagery, sacrifice aimed to prevent chaos through spiritual appeasement.
Most theological traditions, both Christian and pagan, maintain that sacrifice reconciles humanity with God, whose
wrath (or withdrawal of grace, in Augustinian terms) might manifest as societal disorder, enemy invasions, or crop
failures. Divine disinterest could yield similar consequences, with sacrifice serving to regain divine attention.
When sacrifice succeeds in halting chaos, does this reflect satisfied human bloodlust or the restoration of
spiritual order?
While surface appearances might support Girard’s theory, deeper analysis reveals that the sacrificial priest
embodies spiritual order, contrasting with the mob’s instinctual chaos. A mob’s bloodthirst isn’t
satisfied by sacrificing an innocent child — there’s no logical reason it would be.
Instead, the community gains spiritual awareness that sin has been cleansed and divine harmony restored. Order
returns through spiritual reconciliation, not satisfied bloodlust.
Girard contends that vengeance, with its endless cycle of reprisals, poses the primary threat to society (cf.
Girard, 1979, pp. 14-15). He argues that scapegoating avoids this spiral because “sacrifice is
primarily an act of violence without risk of vengeance” (Girard, 1979, p. 13). As he states:
The desire to commit an act of violence on those near us cannot be suppressed without a conflict; we must divert that impulse, therefore, toward the sacrificial victim, the creature we can strike down without fear of reprisal, since he lacks a champion. (ibid. p. 13)
Girard claims that “collective murder restores calm, in dramatic contrast to the hysterical paroxysms that
preceded it” (Girard, 1979, p. 235). However, historical evidence contradicts this. The 1994 Rwandan
genocide, though bearing hallmarks of scapegoat murder, didn’t restore calm but intensified into murderous
frenzy.
Similarly, witch killings often fail to pacify crowds, instead perpetuating violence, as evidenced by headlines
like “Outbreak of witch hunts in Lebowa.” These waves of scapegoat murders continue despite
institutionalization. For nearly three centuries after the late medieval period, Europe experienced recurring
witch-crazes. Witchcraft was theorized as cultic Satanism involving demonic pacts, documented in texts like
Malleus Maleficarum (1486) and Magical Investigations (1600). Despite institutional backing through
legal authorities and theological framework, executions failed to calm public fear. During peak periods,
communities lived in constant dread of witchcraft accusations (vid. Levack, 2006).
Psychologically, persecutors project their sins onto others. While mob killings provide temporary catharsis, they
demand continuous repetition. This represents one manifestation of original sin, which intensifies if unchecked.
Divine sacrifice counteracts sin’s perpetual corrupting influence by restraining our sinful nature. In
Leviticus, the priest’s transfer of communal sins onto the wilderness-bound goat restores divine order.
Girard interprets the priest’s role as analogous to persecution, viewing the goat as an innocent victim
wrongly deemed guilty. This interpretation undermines the sacrifice’s healing power. Christ’s ability
to bear world’s sins stems from his sinlessness. Two distinct phenomena exist: (1) healing sacrifice and
(2) corrupting persecution. Girard conflates these fundamentally different processes. Human psychology offers
two paths: immediate impulse gratification or spiritual peace. Girard acknowledges only the former. Religious
sacrifice differs from scapegoat killing precisely because the victim is viewed as pure rather than guilty,
distinguishing it from witch hunts.
Girard’s failure to differentiate these forms leads him to conclude that pagan sacrifice merely recreates the
founding murder’s cathartic effect. However, evidence suggests it primarily maintained universal order,
aligning with pagan theology. Religious historians identify four distinct sacrifice theories unrelated to
scapegoating: gift theory, propitiation theory, communion theory, and thank-offering theory (cf. Mbiti, 1970,
p. 76).
While Girard maintains that paganism and early biblical culture centered on persecuting falsely accused scapegoats,
he claims in Things Hidden (2003) that Christianity rejects sacrifice entirely. He later moderated this untenable
position. Though Christianity repudiates scapegoating, divine sacrifice operates independently of it. Ancient
peoples offered what they considered valuable and pure to their gods. Biblical stonings, while sometimes expressing
scapegoating tendencies, represented legal execution rather than sacred ritual.
Christian theology, following Paul, interprets Christ’s crucifixion as sacrifice, perpetuated through the
Eucharist as “true and proper sacrifice.” Christianity’s distinctiveness lies in its spiritual
emphasis. Ancient cultures (and some contemporary ones) thought concretely: blood represented life-spirit, and
giving one’s life to God meant literal blood offering. Modern spiritual sacrifice involves life dedication,
exemplified by religious vocations (cf. Nycander, 2007). Thus, Christianity emerges as the quintessential
sacrificial religion, though transformed into spiritual practice.
While Girard sees secular psychosocial perspective replacing pagan sacrificial liturgy through Christian
revelation, the actual transformation moved from concrete to spiritual sacrifice. Ancient thinking was
characteristically concrete. Modern spiritual sacrifice means renouncing worldly attachments and passions to
approach God — a central Christian concept. Ancient cultures expressed this concretely,
sacrificing what they valued most. Carthaginian parents surrendered children for ritual strangulation (cf. Univ. of
Oxford, 2014). In contrast, Switzerland’s Saint Nicholas of Flüe (1417 – 1487)
abandoned family and society for solitary contemplation. Though both actions seem cruel, Nicholas’s sustained
detachment represents deeper sacrifice than the Carthaginians’ temporary separation.
Girard’s theory exhibits Gnostic characteristics (cf. Cohen, 2008), claiming to reveal “things hidden
since the beginning of the world.” This revealed knowledge often contradicts established theology, religious
history, and anthropology. Following Gnostic tradition, Girard presents Yahweh as an ambivalent lower god
(demiurge) and argues that revealing a higher God completely inverts previous patterns. He views the Old Testament
as problematic for maintaining violent divine imagery. While acknowledging its moral superiority to paganism and
evolutionary development, he maintains that “God himself is presented as the principal instigator of the
persecution […] [I]n the Old Testament we never arrive at a conception of the deity that is entirely
foreign to violence” (Girard, 2003, p. 157). Girard interprets Satan as opposing the new order:
From the moment when the sacrificial order begins to come apart, this subject can no longer be anything but the adversary par excellence, which combats the installation of the Kingdom of God. This is the devil known to us from tradition — Satan himself… (Girard, 2003, p. 210)
Such interpretations carry serious implications. While Girard never explicitly states it, his theory suggests
Jews worship a false God, potentially casting Orthodox Jews as Satan’s followers. This sharp division between
old and new could transform adherents of ancient traditions into scapegoats, undermining the new message’s
purpose. Similarly, Marcion of Sinope claimed Christianity completely broke from Judaism and opposed the Tanakh.
Gnostic teachings fueled anti-Jewish sentiment. Conversely, Christian theology emphasizes continuity, recognizing
Judaism as Christianity’s parent faith, sharing sacred texts. The new revelation emerged from the old.
Girard contends that true divine revelation arrives only with Christianity, contradicting traditional Christian
belief in divine continuity. His claim that the Christian God is “entirely foreign to violence” proves
inaccurate. Augustine discusses ‘just war,’ while the gospels portray Jesus displaying anger and
occasional violence. When Jesus healed the leper (Mark 1:40-45), he commanded the traditional Mosaic sacrifice
requiring bird sacrifice.
Christians acknowledge violence’s persistence until divine kingdom’s arrival, reflecting
‘original sin’ doctrine. This fundamental Christian teaching attributes violence to worldly fallenness.
Augustine explains sin and evil as good’s privation — corrupting measure, form, and order
through separation from God (cf. Augustine, De Civ. xi). Does Girard’s theory correctly suggest
humanity lived under violent religious law, worshipping an evil deity? While this appears to explain human warfare,
it fails to account for phenomena like Germany’s aggression. Did these cultured Christians suddenly abandon
their faith for Wotan? Rather, criminal leadership seized control, with mimetic desire driving collective
participation. People joined the mass hysteria to avoid exclusion.
Ironically, Girard’s mimetic theory itself renders the “evil god cult” concept unnecessary.
Neither pagan deities nor the Christian God sought chaos and destruction, but rather universal order. Maintaining
divine order (‘Maat’ in ancient Egyptian theology) sometimes required warfare. Order inherently
involves conflict, strife, and rivalry, as evidenced in ecological systems. Similarly, societal order depends on
the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence through police forces.
The notion of a violence-free world proves dangerous. Contemporary left-wing radicals envision a world without
force, war, ethnic conflicts, or racism. They view police and military monopoly on violence as merely perpetuating
oppression and violent ideals. This thinking manifests in anti-police sentiment during demonstrations, with
extremists demanding police abolition. Such ideology aligns with Girard’s “theology,” which
centers on human culture’s accommodation and perpetuation of violence.
Girard contends that “the archaic gods are sacralized scapegoats. In revealing their innocence, the
Judeo-Christian tradition desacralizes scapegoats and brings the age of myth to a close” (2014, p. 39).
This suggests gods represent transformed lynch victims like accused witches. However, mythological gods and heroes
aren’t depicted as reformed evil-doers. This theory would require widespread historical narrative revision
when priests later recognized their victims’ benevolence — a complex hypothesis lacking
supporting evidence. Consider Osiris among dying-and-rising gods: before Seth’s murder, he ruled as the
benevolent king of the Golden Age, contradicting Girard’s scapegoat pattern.
What explains the origin of gods and spirits? They continue manifesting in dreams! Aboriginal peoples experience
ancestral visitations, granting their forebears divine status. Roman emperors achieved divine rank with dedicated
temples, like Colchester’s Temple of Claudius, without preceding witch-hunt executions. Medieval and modern
veneration of saints, such as St. Paul and St. Augustine, whose spirits seemingly oversee humanity,
represents a form of ancestor worship. Dream experiences and ancestor veneration offer documented explanations for
deity origins, unlike the unsupported theory of murdered scapegoats transforming into benevolent gods.
Regarding scapegoat origins, modern psychology explains that unconscious content manifests through projection.
Unacknowledged inner darkness typically projects onto individuals or groups, who become scapegoats for personal
failings and inadequacies. This process operates independently of religious belief and would persist without
religion’s development. Shadow projection and violence resist elimination through ’scapegoat
desacralization’ because they stem from humanity’s instinctual and unconscious nature. As
Carl Jung explains:
Projection is one of the commonest psychic phenomena. […] Everything that is unconscious in ourselves we discover in our neighbour, and we treat him accordingly. We no longer subject him to the test of drinking poison; we do not burn him or put the screws on him; but we injure him by means of moral verdicts pronounced with the deepest conviction. What we combat in him is usually our own inferior side. (CW 10, para. 131)
Psychoanalytic research indicates that shadow projection tendency isn’t learned from pre-Christian
religion or myth. Rather, it emerges autonomously from human unconsciousness. It neither results from non-Christian
religious adherence nor from misunderstanding or forgetting Christian teachings. Christianity can only moderate
this fundamental psychological phenomenon.
Summation
Girard’s secular perspective aligns with postmodernism, arguably the secular ideology of the Antichrist. Like
Freud, he attributes superiority to Christianity while maintaining atheistic views. His goal of
“demystifying” religion reduces Christianity to mythic truth through its inversion of sacrificial
patterns. He interprets secularization as Christianity’s modern fulfillment rather than its adversary. His
conception reduces God to projected human abstractions.
Rejecting divine existence leads him to deny traditional sacrificial atonement theology. He permits only profane
interpretations of sacrifice, equating all sacrificial acts with scapegoating. This view conflates sacrifice with
witch hunting, claiming both require ‘misrecognition’ — perceiving victims as guilty
through projection. This implies the illogical conclusion that Israelites viewed sacrificial lambs as evil.
Girard’s heretical approach “deconstructs” religion from within. He denies Christ’s return
to the Father, reducing his death to mere scapegoat murder. This marks religious worship’s end, supposedly
enabling a violence-free world — a Rousseauean earthly paradise. He anticipates religion’s
demise and violence’s permanent cessation in human civilization. This contradicts biological reality and
Christian theology, which maintains sin’s presence until world’s end. I have demonstrated that
Girard’s theories prove logically flawed, diverge from established theology, and contradict empirical
evidence.
© Mats Winther, 2020. (2025: minor emendations.)
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